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In fundamental outline, conscription of manpower has changed little since
1917.1 The basic features remain universal liability for military service of
the male population of designated ages and the selection, by an administrative
system which relies chiefly on the discretion of local boards, of those most
fit for training and service and most easily spared from the nation's pro-
ductive effort. The choice of this method in preference to a system of calling
all men within certain age classes or of encouraging extensive voluntary service
seems wise in view of the efficiency of selective service in the last war and
the opportunities, not present in alternative schemes, to control its effect upon
business and civilian life.
Any challenge to the legislation as a whole on constitutional grounds would
be met by the Selective Draft Cases- which held that the war power3 is
not limited by the militia clause,4 and that possible limitations on the power
by the Fifth and Thirteenth Amendments do not preclude compulsory mili-
tary service. Although the influence of the war may have caused the Court
in these cases to brush aside rather than answer some objections, there is
no indication that this authority would not be followed.
Since the needs of preparation are as vital as those of actual war, there
would be little reason for applying to the present legislation different tests
of constitutionality and social desirability merely because it is the first instance
of a military draft in time of peace. Indeed, the recent prevalence of unde-
clared wars and the present equivocal international position of the United
States suggest that the line between "war" and "peace" has become indistinct.
The one new feature of the Act, designed to prevent the economic dislo-
cation of drafted men by providing for their reemployment, indicates that
Congress has looked beyond the immediate problem of raising men. And
the purpose of this discussion- based on the assumption that the Act will
1. Compare Pub. L. No. 783, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (Sept. 16, 1940) (hereinafter
cited by section only) with the Selective Service Act of 1917, 40 STAT. 76 (1917).
Comparison of the army's plans for wartime conscription as of 1936 with the present
Act strikingly illustrates differences between provisions essential for purely military
purposes and those attempting to fit the draft into normal civil life. See Smn. Rm. No.
944, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), part 4, p. 69 et seq.
2. 245 U. S. 366 (1918).
3. U. S. CoNsT. Art. 1, §8 provides that Congress shall have the power: "To
declare War . . . to raise and support Armies, . . . to make Rules for the Govern-
ment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; . . . to make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers. .. "
4. Ibid. ". . . to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; . . ." Section 3(e) of the present
Act limits the service of those inducted into the land forces to the Western Hemisphere
or United States possessions.
5. See Black, The Selective Draft Cases-.l Judicial Milepost on the Road to
Absolutism (1931) 11 B. U. L. REv. 37.
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successfully mobilize the nation's manpower for direct military service -
is to indicate possible impacts of this legislation, political and economic, on
the rights of the individual and his present pattern of life, and to consider
possible future tendencies in the event of a swing toward or away from war.
A. THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF CONSCRIPTION
Registration. - The first and most universal obligation imposed by the
Act is registration.; Although the primary purpose of registering and
classifying is to select the men most fitted for immediate training, an im-
portant consequence is to supply the government with detailed information
concerning a large portion of the population. 7 Reactions as to the desirability
of this result may differ,8 but it is interesting to note that one of England's
early measures in the present war was to institute nation-wide registration,
apparently to ascertain in detail the occupations and qualifications of its
population.9
Selection. - The fundamental administrative units in the selection process
are the local boards, exercising broad discretion within the general standards
of the Act and the regulations. Determinations of these boards, subject only
to review by appeal boards and, in rare instances, by the President, are final
on the vital questions of exemptions, or deferments because of dependents
or essential occupations.Y0 It is therefore exceedingly important that there
6. Section 2. The men who were between the ages of 21 and 35 on Oct. 16, 1940,
and so were required to register, will be legally liable to call until Sept. 1945. Those
who become 21 within that time will be subject to registration when the President
proclaims subsequent registration days. Judging from the experience of the last war,
the men actually inducted into the army will be largely from the lower age groups.
2 REP. PRovosT-MAusHAr. GEN. (1919) 189.
7. Some information is supplied by the registration cards themselves, and more
complete data will be obtained through the questionnaires that follow.
8. Compare the enthusiasm of Provost-Marshal-General Crowder at having an in-
ventory of the nation's manpower, with objections to the tagging and numbering of
millions of Americans. 2 REP. PROVOST-MARSHAL-GEN. (1919) 3; The Burke Wadsworth
Conscription Bill (1940) 9 INT. JluaD. Ass'r BULL. No. 2, p. 15.
9. National Registration Act, 1939, 2 and 3 GEO. VI, c. 91. All persons are obliged
to register and give such particulars as to name, age, occupation, etc., as the Ministers
may prescribe. Each registrant receives an identity card which must be shown on request
to constables or other authorized persons. The United States now requires the regis-
tration of all aliens. Pub. L. No. 670, 76th Cong., 3d Sess, (June 28, 1940). For a
collection of state statutes requiring their registration for informational purposes, see
(1939) 53 HAmv. L. REv. 149, 150.
10. Section 10(a) (2). A similar provision was given judicial sanction in 1917.
Angelus v. Sullivan, 246 Fed. 54, 62 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917). For present standards for these
deferments, see SELECTIVE SERVICE REGULATIONS (1940) (hereinafter cited as REGuLA-
TIONS) §§ 351, 352, 354, 355.
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be no striking disparity between the decisions of different boards.,' Conse-
quently the President has been given power to make the "necessary rules and
regulations."'12 Within these regulations, uniform administration, of course,
depends largely upon the personnel of the local boards ;13 the persuasive effect
of instructions from their superiors in the Selective Service Administration
is the only coordinating force other than the appeals system. The regulations
relating to appeals are substantially the same as those promulgated in the
last war.:4 Registrants dissatisfied with their classification, or those claiming
deferred classification in their behalf,' 5 may within a limited time appeal as of
right to an appeal board' 0 and, in special cases, to the President.11 The
Government always has a right of appeal.' 8 The appeal boards may make
any classification they deem proper.'0
Although the registrant may appear in person before the local board, he
has no right to be represented by counsel or to present oral testimony of
witnesses 20 The combination of this rather summary procedure and the
almost unlimited discretion of the local board on substantive issues makes
11. The American Civil Liberties Union fears that such a disparity may arise in
dealing with conscientious objectors. N. Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1940, § 1, p. 7, col. 4. There
are indications that in England these fears have been realized. See Tuc M \cnEsam
GUARDIAN WEEK:LY, Dec. 29, 1939, p. 519, col. 2.
12. Section 10(a) (1), (2).
13. The successful administration of the World War draft indicates the competency
of its local boards. Section 10(a) (2) provides for the same system of civilian members
appointed by the President on recommendation of the highest state officials.
14. SELECrIV SERvicE REGULATIONS (2d ed. 1918).
15. Such as dependents, employers, or unions. See note 20 infra.
16. REGULATIONS § 370. No appeal, however, may be made in which the applicant
merely seeks to change from one deferred classification to another.
Although the appeal boards will not, of course, exert a nation-wide centralization,
they will prevent disparities within limited areas.
17. Id.§ 379.
18. Id. § 371.
19. Id.§ 374.
20. Sections 367, 368, 369. Although classification may present few traditionally legal
problems, assistance of counsel might enable a registrant to present his case more con-
vincingly.
An example of the extent of interests affected by the selection process is its possible
influence on labor controversies. Indispensability of individuals must of necessity be
determined largely by testimony of their employers, thus giving the latter a strategical
advantage. See N. Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1940, p. 8, col. 3; (1940) 7 La. RE.L. REP. 73.
The director of Selective Service has suggested that employers list registrants in their
employ who do not have dependents, and determine those who cannot be immediately
replaced if called for training. Selective Service Release No. 90, Oct. 26,1940, C. C. H.
War Law Serv. f 64521. Those seeking industrial deferment must file affidavits from their
employers and immediate superiors. But any interested party, and hence presumably a
labor union, may present evidence on their behalf. REGULrTONs § 322. See N. Y. Times,
Oct. 11, 1940, p. 11, col. 1. Moreover, the employer's strategical advantage might possibly
be offset by the appointment of labor advisers to the appeal boards.
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it important that in the appeal boards there be a real opportunity for cor-
recting unfairness. But their review, limited to written evidence in the
registrant's file, does not appear adequate where the individual's liberty is
so vitally affected. 21 The absence at the outset of more complete standards
for decision and of the common procedural protections is unfortunate, since
under the strain of war or intense preparation therefor, public opinion adverse
to appeals and the pressure of numbers might handicap efforts to secure
uniformity and fairness of administration through the appeals system.
The problem of conscientious objectors contains implications going beyond
the single question of administration. As a delicate moral issue, as a breeder
of violent controversy and epithets, and as a subterfuge for evasion it offers
complexities that only self-restraint and calm judgment can unravel. Both
statute and administration in the last war were unsatisfactory in that they
exempted only well-established pacifist sects 22 and exposed many objectors
to unsympathetic army officers.23 The 1940 Act, which appears to profit
from the British experience, 24 recognizes any objection based on religious
training and belief and provides for some civilian service2 5 - thus offering
at least a broader base for a more successful solution.2G Despite these con-
21. Sections 373, 374.
22. 40 STAT. 78 (1917). Provided there are adequate tests of sincerity, only a phil-
osophy that considers exemptions for conscientious objectors as mere political concessions
can justify limiting exemptions to members of established pacifist groups and excluding
others who have scruples of conscience. See the statements of representatives of the
Quakers and the American Civil Liberties Union in Hearings before Committee on
Military Affairs on S. 4164, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 164, 308-10.
23. For an account of the difficulties in dealing with conscientious objectors in the
army and the concessions found necessary, see 2 REP. PROVOST-MARSEAL-GEN. (1919)
60 et seq. Some civilian service was eventually allowed. See also Hcarings before Com-
inittee on Military Affairs on S. 4164, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 198, 199.
24. The National Service (Armed Forces) Act, 1939, 2 and 3 GEo. VI, c. 81, § 5
provides for a special register of conscientious objectors, hearings before local tribunals
to establish sincerity, and division into three classes: (1) those proving absolute objections
to any service; (2) those objecting to any military service and receiving civilian service;
3) those objecting to combatant duty. Apparently the proportion of conscientious ob-
jectors registering has not been over 3%. See Hearings before Committee on Military
Affairs ,on S. 4164, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 310.
25. Section 5 (g) provides for investigation by the Department of Justice of claims
of those who appeal from refusal by local boards to classify them as conscientious
objectors "by reason of religious training and belief." Thereafter the Department recom-
mends the disposition of the claim to the appeal boards, where the appellant may be
classified for non-combatant or civilian service, depending upon the extent of the objection.
These provisions were added to the law after its introduction. See the original bill,
S. 4164, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). The administrative policy appears to be to avoid
the issue as much as possible. Appeal boards are to consider any possible grounds for
deferment before deciding on the conscientious objection. REGULATIONS §§ 363, 375. The
local boards will keep a public register of objectors. REGULATIONS § 366.
26. See Baldwin, Conscientious Objectors, THE NATION, October 12, 1940, p. 326.
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cessions, those who have objections stemming from non-religious convictions
are still unprotected.
2 7
Induction.- The importance of induction into the armed forces is that
it marks the transition to military status. Under the Act of 1917 a notice
to report for duty subjected its recipient to military law;2 failure to obey,
even if the offender had not registered, could lead to court martial for deser-
tion. 29 Under the present statute, military law cannot be applied until the
person is "actually inducted" into the armed forces,30 which occurs, according
to the regulations, when the oath of allegiance is taken at the army induction
center.31 Men within the registration ages thus escape automatic subjection
to the rigors of military law.
Active Service. - The status of the conscript once he is in the armed forces
differs radically from his former position in civil life. His constitution and
laws are the Articles of War and the Army Regulations. The governing
concept is not freedom of individual development but unquestioning obedience
to command. In place of the civil courts and a procedure designed to protect
liberties of the individual are the courts-martial, where of necessity an author-
itarian control exists. Quite apart from the possibility of abuse of this great
power, military service will substantially deprive the nation of conscripts'
participation in political affairs.32 In connection with the important problem
of voting, there may be at least a temporary difficulty until adequate legis-
lation for absentee registration and voting can be secured in states in which
it is lacdng.33 Moreover, conscripts may be forbidden to engage in activities
which their superiors consider detrimental to military policy. Activities that
are undertaken must conform to the requirements of the Articles of War,
of which the most significant is the indefinite Article 96, permitting punish-
ment of "all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and military
discipline. . . and all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military
service." 3 5
27. From a statement of the director of Selective Service of New York City, it
may be inferred that "religious" in "religious training and belief" will be construed as
modifying "belief," as well as "training." See N. Y. Times, Nov. 10, § 1, p. 30, col. 1.
Cf. D. S. S. Form 47, C. C. H. War Law Service, 64523.
28. Franke v. Murray, 248 Fed. 865 (C. C.A. 8th, 1918).
29. Ex parte Dunn, 250 Fed. 871 (D. Mass. 1918).
30. Section 11.
31. RnuL.Arioxs § 429.
32. On the other hand, military life may exert a democratizing influence.
33. See Steinbicker, Absentee Voting in the United States (1938) 32 Au. PoL- Scr.
REv. 808. New Jersey recently passed such a law. N. Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1940, p. 14,
col. 3. There is pressure for one in New York. N. Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1940, p. 12, col. 1.
Only one day's leave of absence to permit voting in person is required. Section 8(h).
34. 10 U. S. C. §§ 1471-1593 (1934), as amended 50 STAT. 724 (1937), 10 U. S. C.
§§ 1522, 1542 (Supp. 1939).
35. See Carbaugh, Pleading and Practice Under the 96th Article of JJar (1918)
13 ILL. L. REv. 1.
19401
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The system of trial of these offenses by courts-martial 30 aroused consider-
able controversy after the last war.3 7 Several reforms were instituted, designed
to give the accused more of the privileges of the defendant in a criminal trial,
and to secure more legal guidance for the court and adequate review on the
law.3 8 Maximum limits were set for sentences in time of peace.3 0 Despite
these reforms, military judges will continue to be influenced by their training
and philosophy. And no review in the civil courts is available except on
the question whether the court-martial has exceeded the jurisdiction conferred
upon it by the Articles of War.
40
Return to Civilian Life. -On his discharge, if in the judgment of his
superiors he merits it, each man will get a certificate of satisfactory service.41
Since the acquisition of such a certificate is prerequisite to enjoyment of
the reemployment provisions of the Act,4 2 great power is vested in com-
manding officers. The Act places final determination of satisfactory service
in the hands of the army- thus any men denied their certificates would
36. Art. 2 subjects to military law "all . . . persons lawfully called, drafted, or
ordered into . . . the.said service. . . ." By Arts. 12, 13, and 14 the jurisdiction of
courts-martial includes the trial of all persons subject to military law for any crime or
offense made punishable by the Articles. For offenses also within the jurisdiction of
the civil courts, Art. 74 provides that, except in time of war, the commanding officer
shall on due application exert himself to the utmost to deliver the offender to the civil
authorities. In time of war, the military authorities have priority. Ex parte Xing,
246 Fed. 868 (E. D. Ky. 1917).
37. Compare Ansell, Military Justice (1919) 5 CORN. L. Q. 1, with Bogert, Courts-
Martial- Criticism and Proposed Reforms (1919) 5 CORN. L. Q. 18. See Morgan, The
Existing Court-Martial System and the Ansell Army Articles (1919) 29 YALE L. J. 52.
Although consideration of military discipline may be thought to justify the rather sum-
mary procedure of the courts-martial, it may be argued that the procedure prescribed by
Articles of War drafted for professional soldiers is ill-adapted for a conscript army in
peacetime.
38. Compare 39 STAT. 650 et seq. (1916), with 41 STAT. 787 et seq. (1920), 10
U. S. C. §§ 1471-1593 (1934), for significant changes in Arts. 4, 8, 17, 18, 21, 31, 32,
38, 40, 43, 46, addition of Art. 50Y', and the change in Art. 70. See Note (1921) 21
COL. L. REv. 477. No such reforms have been made in the Articles for the Government
of the Navy. See 34 U. S. C. § 1200 (1934). There is little immediate prospect, how-
ever, of requiring conscripts to serve in the navy. See N. Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1940,
p. 1, col. 2.
39. Arts. 43, 45.
40. Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U. S. 109 (1895) ; Ex parte Mason, 105 U. S. 696 (1881);
Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. 65 (U. S. 1857). This may occur when a court-martial
attempts to assert jurisdiction over a person not subject to military law, or when it
attempts to deal with a person subject to its jurisdiction in a manner not authorized
by the Articles of War.
One army officer tried for 25 years without success to obtain review of a court-martial.
For his latest attempt, see Carter v. Woodring, 92 F. (2d) 544 (App. D. C. 1937),





presumably have to exhaust their administrative remedies within the army,43
and could then secure court review only if their superiors had denied them
a hearing or decided arbitrarily."
Following the year's training, conscripts are transferred to reserve com-
ponents of their services for a ten-year period or until they attain the age
of forty-five, whichever happens first.45 Only a militaristic policy would
require their subjection to military law before they were again called to active
duty, and the second Article of War appears to assign inactive reservists to
a civilian status.46 But the power to call out reservists, 47 once a large group
had entered this class, might conceivably under appropriate legislation
be used as an indirect but effective way of silencing activities objectionable
to the Government or the army. Those who have served their year under
the Selective Service Act are liable to be recalled in the discretion of the
President under existing or future laws for the calling to active duty of their
reserve units.4 8 The National Guard Resolution authorizes the President
to call the present reserve components of the army for a year's active training
whenever he deems it necessary for strengthening the national defense.
49
Although this service appears to parallel that required under the Selective
Service Act, it is not clear whether conscripts on entering reserve units could
be called for another year of duty. It may be too early to insist on exact
legislative definition of this subject, but should conscription continue many
years, peacetime liability of reservists to active service should be carefully
delimited.
- 43. Cf. Ex parte Kusweski, 251 Fed. 977 (N. D. N. Y. 1918); see Comment (1938)
51 HIARv. L. REV. 1251. The only formal administrative remedy would appear to be a
complaint under Art 121 of the Articles of War.
44. Cf. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253 (1905) ; see Ng Fung Ho v. White,
259 U. S. 276, 284 (1922). These cases arose in immigration tribunals, which are
analogous to the courts-martial in their relation to civil courts.
45. Section 3(c). But liability for reserve service may be avoided by two additional
years of active service.
46. This Article subjects to military law "all . . persons lawfully called, drafted,
or ordered into or to duty or for training in, the said service, from the dates they
are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same." The implica-
tion of this and the acts establishing the reserve units is that the "said service" refers
only to active duty. Cf. DIGFST OF OPINIONS OF JUDGE-ADvOCATE GEN.RAL (Jan.-June
1921) 24. Failure to obey a lawful call is, of course, desertion and within military
jurisdiction.
47. Present provisions for calling up reserves generally authorize summoning "mem-
bers" of the different organizations. See note 49 infra. There is apparently no require-
ment that certain classes or units be called as a group.
48. Section 3(c).
49. National Guard and Reserves Resolution, Pub. Res. No. 96, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.
(Aug. 27, 1940) § 1. Previous liability to active service except in time of emergency
did not exceed 15 days. 10 U. S. C. §§ 343, 369, 426 (Supp. 1939).
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Penal Provisions. - Unlike its predecessor, the 1940 Act forbids anyone
knowingly counseling its evasion.50 In the last war, convictions for this type
of activity5 ' had to be sought under the section of the, Espionage Act for-
bidding obstruction of recruiting for, or incitement of insubordination in,
the armed forces.5 2 Some of these convictions were of slight credit to a
demccratic government,53 having as their sole ground the dissemination of
socialistic or pacifist propaganda which did not directly urge disobedience
to the draft. 54 And after the war, reexamination of the fundamentals of
free speech indicated that the severity arose largely from the judicial use of
indefinite tests for causation and intent which placed little restraint upon
naturally unsympathetic juries.55
50. Section 11 provides that whoever "knowingly counsels, aids, or abets another
to evade registration or service in the land or naval forces or any of the requirements
of this Act, or of said rules, regulations, or directions, . . . shall, upon conviction in
the district court of the United States having jurisdiction thereof, be punished by
imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000, or by
both such fine and imprisonment, or if subject to military or naval law may be tried
by court-martial, and, on conviction, shall suffer such punishment as a court-martial
may direct."
51. Section 6 of the 1917 Act prohibited only such conduct as constituted actual or
attempted evasion of its requirements. 40 STAT. 81 (1917). Since it did not forbid
counseling its evasion, action that could not be proved to result in either an attempted
or a completed violation could not be punished, though such action might seek to induce
disobedience by others. Cf. Unittd States v. Galleanni, 245 Fed. 977 (D. Mass. 1917)
(counseling evasion of draft not an "offense" under any federal statute before Espionage
Act, but erroneously held to be a federal common-law crime); Hammerschmidt v.
United States, 265 U. S. 182 (1924) (prosecution for same conduct; no offense under
draft act alleged). Hence the resort to the Espionage Act.
52. Espionage Act of 1917, § 3, 40 STAT. 219 (1917) as amended, 40 STAT. 533
(1918), 50 U. S. C. § 33 (1934). The Amendment added prohibitions almost as indefinite
and sweeping as those of the Sedition Act of 1798. It was repealed at the end of the
war. 41 STAT. 1360 (1921). But significantly many doubtful convictions were secured
under the apparently limited language of the original act. The 1917 Act is still effective
in time of war; should the nation become engaged in war, its provisions may overlap
with those of the instant statute.
53. E.g., Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239 (1920); United States v. Rose
Pastor Stokes, U. S. Dept. Justice Bull. No. 106 (W. D. Mo. 1917), rcv'd, 264 Fed. 18
(C. C. A. 8th, 1920). But cf. United States v. Baker, 247 Fed. 124 (D. Md. 1917).
See Note (1919) 32 HARV. L. Rav. 417.
54. Rose Pastor Stokes wrote a letter to the press stating that she opposed the
government because it was for the profiteers, while she was for the people. In 1917 the
district court permitted a conviction; in 1920 the circuit court reversed, stressing the
necessity for "extraordinary coolness, care and impartiality" to prevent patriotic fervor
from usurping the sphere of justice. Stokes v. United States, 264 Fed. 18, 25 (C. C. A.
8th, 1920). In Pierce v. United States, 252 U. S. 239 (1920) (Holmes and Brandeis
dissenting) the conviction was for circulating a Socialist pamphlet, after the defendants
had waited until the court in United States v. Baker, 247 Fed. 124 (D. Md. 1917),
had directed an acquittal for distribution of the same pamphlet.
55. See Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time (1919) 32 HtAv. L. Rav. 932.
In England official curtailment of individual liberties has been similarly criticized.
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The importance of propaganda and civilian morale in modem war may
require that the formation of public opinion be more completely controlled
than ever before. Evidence of this may be found in the all-inclusive and
indefinite prohibitions of the British and Canadian Defense Regulations,r G
which give free rein to the war-sensitive judicial or administrative bodies. In
the present American situation, however, freedom of discussion must still
be safeguarded. It is important, therefore, to note statutes susceptible in
time of strain to the distortion received by the World War acts. Already
both the substance of the sections of the Espionage Acts forbidding inter-
ference with the armed forces and a general criminal syndicalism act have
been placed in those sections of the Alien Registration Act which have general
application.5c By and large the penal section of the present draft law parallels
the 1917 Act, with the additional requirement throughout of "knowing" viola-
tion.58 Its prohibitions appear carefully defined and close to the traditional
concepts of criminal attempt and conspiracy. However, the added phrase,
"who knowingly counsels . . . another to evade . . . any of the require-
ments of this Act," although narrowed in the process of drafting,5 9 and
possibly as free from danger as the other provisions, appears susceptible to
that elastic construction for which the Espionage Acts were criticized.
B. Tim ECONOMIC IMPACT or CONSCRIPTION OF MANI'OWER
Moratory Provisions. - Concern with the financial problems of the soldier
is by no means novel in American legislative experience. Many states,
See The Dangers of D. 0. R. A., THE MAxcHEsTr Gumwmx WEEKLY, Nov. 3, 1939,
p. 352. But there the problem is the extent to which rulemaking powers should be given
to and exercised by the Home Secretary. See ibid.; WILLIs, PtAlnm.sx"rAny Povn oF
ENGLIsH GovEaaIENT DEPARTmENTS (1933) 27-29, 93; Comment (1917) 31 HAv. L
Rxv. 296.
56. See Defense (General) Regulations, 1939, S. R. & 0. 1939, No. 927 (as amended)
§§ 1A, 2C, 39A, 39B, 39BA (appearing in Bue's LoosE-LEAF WAR LEGiSLTIOn (1939)
558 et seq.; ibid. (1940) 629 et seq., 730) ; Defense of Canada Regulations, 1939, Nos.
39, 39A, 62. The British regulations forbid conduct which the individual has "reasonable
cause to believe likely" to have certain injurious results. The Canadian laws extend to
acts "intended to or likely to cause!' disaffection to his Majesty, etc. The elasticity of
such definitions is apparent.
57. Alien Registration Act §§ 1-5, Pub. L. No. 670, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (June 28,
1940). Cf. (1939) 53 HARv. L. REv. 149.
58. The insertion of "knowingly" in the statute appears intended to require proof
of a criminal intent. Cf. SEN. REP. No. 944, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936), part 4, appendix
p. 72, § 10 (penal section of the army's proposed wartime draft plan of 1936).
59. Neither the original bill nor the version reported to the Senate contained "know-
ingly." See S.4164, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) § 10 and SEN. Rm. No. 2002, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1940). In the committee hearings, however, Senator Burke stated that
the objectives of the penal section were not directed at any opposition that did not seek
to urge disobedience of the law. See Hearings before Senate Committee oi Military
Affairs, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940) 156. But the inefficacy of the term "willfully" in
the Espionage Act to prevent doubtful convictions renders dubious the sufficiency of
"knowingly" as a safeguard.
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prompted by solicitude for the morale of the armed forces, have enacted
moratory legislation for the protection of their citizens from suit while en-
gaged in wartime military service.00 Although morale would clearly have
been enhanced by uniform treatment, it was not until 1918 that Congress
made general provision for the preservation of the fighting man's economic
position.61 The World War statute has served as a model for the present
moratory legislation. 2 The validity of the earlier law was sustained 3 as a
war measure and its desirability during peace-time conscription seems beyond
question.
Early moratory legislation in the United States generally took the rigid
form of a suspension of remedies for some or all obligations of all men in
the army.64 But experience has demonstrated the wisdom of achieving greater
flexibility by vesting discretion in the courts. Many conscripts can and should
pay their obligations in full. A rigid moratorium may, moreover, impair
the purchasing power of men by deterring merchants from extending credit
to them and their dependents.65 Therefore, both the 1918 Act and the present
law, as well as their English counterpart, 0 have entrusted to the trial courts
extensive discretion in according moratory protection to those in military
service.
67
60. Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study (1933) 46 HA v. L. REv.
1061, 1085.
61. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act, 40 STAT. 440 (1918). The federal act
abrogated all laws inconsistent therewith. Pierrard v. Hoch, 97 Ore. 71, 191 Pac. 328
(1920); Konkel v. State, 168 Wis. 335, 170 N. W. 715 (1919). But cf. Austby v. Yellow-
stone Valley Mortgage Co., 63 Mont. 444, 207 Pac. 631 (1922).
62. Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 861, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. (Oct. 17, 1940).
63. Clark v. Mechanics American National Bank, 282 Fed. 589 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922).
See Ferry, Rosenbaum, and Wigmore, The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Rights Bill (1918)
12 ILL. L. REv. 449, 472-75. For argument against its validity, see DUXIAM, MORATORY
LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1917) 12-19. Many state statutes have been held
to violate the clause of the federal Constitution forbidding the states to impair the
obligation of contracts. Id. at 9-12. But objections on this basis seem no longer tenable.
See BLAIR, BREACH OF CONTRACT DUE TO WAR (1940) 68.
64. Feller, Moratory Legislation: A Comparative Study (1933) 46 HARv. L. Rv.
1061, 1074; Comment (1920) 4 MINN. L. REV. 353, 354.
65. 55 CONG. Rac. 7789 (1917).
66. Courts (Emergency Powers) Act, 1939, 2 and 3 GEo. VI, c. 67.
67. Cf., e.g., Fennell v. Frisch's Adm'r, 192 Ky. 535, 234 S.W. 198 (1921) ; Gilluly
v. Hawkins, 108 Wash. 79, 182 Pac. 958 (1919).
Congress might well have clarified certain provisions of the 1918 act by indicating,
for example, whether the mortgage moratorium includes periods of redemption. Compare
Ebert v. Poston, 266 U. S. 548 (1925), with Steinfield v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins.
Co., 80 N. H. 39, 112 Atl. 800 (1921). And there is still some doubt whether secret
interests of those in military service are protected. See (1918) 4 MASS. L. Q. 31. But cl.




While the Act protects the economic position of the conscript by suspending
creditors' actions during his time of active service, it affords no solution to
the problem of payment of accumulated obligations upon return to civil life,
or to the difficulty of supporting his dependents in the interim.0s In the last
war, the United States, as well as the European nations, made provision for
payment of allowances to the dependents of men in active servicec 9 Extensive
measures are in force in Europe for the maintenance of persons who were
formerly supported by men in military service, and who have not sufficient
resources in their absence.70 While such legislation has been considered in
the United States, Congress has postponed its enactment. 7'
Reemployment Provisions.- The most important of the draft law pro-
visions designed to mitigate the economic hardships of the conscript is the
guaranty that his job will be restored 72 to him with reparation for any loss
caused by the employer's unlawful refusal to rehire him on his return.7
68. The National Guard Resolution (1940) 9 Ix. JuRiD. Ass'x BULL. 25, 26; ci.
Nichols, Moratorium and Stay Laws (1919) 4 VA. L. REG. (7.s.) 645, 646.
While it seems unlikely at present that men with dependents will be called, future
exigencies may necessitate a change in this policy.
69. War Risk Insurance Act, 40 STAT. 398 (1917); GovErME.T A PRovsxos,'s
IN THE UNIrE STATES AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR MEMBERS OF "THE MIL1TARY FonC-S
AND THEIR DEPENDENTS (Children's Bureau, U. S. Dep't Labor (1917) No. 11) 26.
The amount of allowances paid out during the last war amounted to 26$5,986,935.52.
[1920] REP. SEc'y TREAS. ON THE STATE OF THE FINANCES (1921) 201. Individual
families received from $15 to $30 depending on the circumstances of each case. See
Lathrop, Provision for the Care of Families and Dependents of Soldiers and Sailors
(1918) 7 AcAD. OF Por- Sci. Pnoc. 796, 799 et seq. Provision was made not only for
wives and children but also for parents, grandchildren, brothers, and sisters. Ibid.
70. See Allowances for Families of Mobilized Men (1939) 40 INT. L.AU. RLv. 677.
71. 86 Cong. Rec., Sept. 30, 1940, at 19402. A Senate amendment providing for
such aid disappeared in conference on the Excess Profits Tax Act of 1940.
Some business firms have decided to furnish financial aid to their drafted employees.
(1940) 7 LAB. REL REP. 73. Section 3(f) emxpressly permits this and a recent ruling
of the Internal Revenue Bureau allows the deduction of salaries paid employees in national
service as a regular expense. I. T. 3417, Oct. 14, 1940, 9 U. S. L WVr n 2235.
72. Section 8(b). The provisions of this section are limited, however, to those
persons who (1) obtain a certificate of satisfactory training and service, (2) are still
qualified to perform the duties of the position, and (3) make application for reemploy-
ment within forty days after they are relieved from training and service. Section 8(c)
buttresses the job guaranty with the mandate that the conscript shall not be discharged
without cause within one year after restoration to his position.
73. Section 8(e). To enable the conscript to preserve these rights, this Section
provides that the United States District Attorney or comparable officials for the district
in which the employer maintains a place of business shall, if reasonably satisfied that
the person applying is entitled to benefits, act as his attorney. The conscript is further
encouraged to bring suit by provisions that no fees or court costs shall be taxed against
him-apparently even when he loses or his suit is unreasonable. He may, however,
sue only in the district court of the United States for the district in which the employer
maintains a place of business.
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While many European countries at the close of the World War compelled
employers to reinstate demobilized workers in 'their former employment,
74
in the United States it was considered "impracticable to require reinstate-
ment in statu quo."' 75 And it is significant that even before the present
hostilities, most European states took measures to ensure that civilians return-
ing home from military duties would be restored to their former employment.70
This provision seems well within the war power of Congress" and, in the
light of foreign experience and in fairness to the conscript, is highly desirable.
The reemployment requirement will no doubt raise thorny problems but
they will not all be unfamiliar. Decisions under the National Labor Relations
Act which empowers the Labor Board to order reinstatement, with or with-
out back pay, of employees who have been victims of unfair labor practices,
will provide a convenient fund of experience from which the courts can
receive guidance.78 As in the NLRA, Congress has not explicitly provided
for any relief for the employer. 79 The result may well be an anomalous
situation: the employee entitled to all the rights of a continuing employment
relation and the employer entitled to none.80 This interpretation would
negative the idea that the employment contract is merely suspended for a
year,"' thus obviating the possibility of recovery by the employer against his
74. E.g., the Belgian Law of Oct. 24, 1919, [1919] 2 PASINOMIE 129.
75. See Ferry, Rosenbaum, and Wigmore, The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Rights
Bill (1918) 12 ILL. L. REv. 472-75. The authors helped draft this act.
The demobilization of the American armed forces led to a variety of state laws
designed to provide employment for returning soldiers. See LABOR LEGISLATION Or 1919
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bull. 277, 1921) 26-28. The Federal Government, pursuing
a policy similar to that provided by § 8(g) of the present conscription law, fostered a
national organization for the purpose of aiding soldiers to obtain private employment.
Litchfield, United States Emnployment Service and Demobilization (1919) 81 ANNALS 19.
But little increase in unemployment resulted from demobilization. 3 LmscomER AND
BRANDEIS, HISTORY OF LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932 (1935) 133.
76. See Labour Problems in Tine of War (1939) 40 INT. LAD. REv. 589, 596.
77. See notes 2 and 3 supra; cf. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1
(1937) , see Keir, Post-War Caueses of Labor Unrest (1919) 81 ANNALS 101, 103.
78. The original, draft of the Conscription Act made the unlawful refusal to rehlre
conscripts an unfair labor practice within the meaning of the NLRA. SEN. REP. No.
2002, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
79. Of late, however, the NLRB has been hearing certain requests of employers.
Rules and Regulations of the NLRB, Series 2, as amended and effective July 14, 1939,
Art. III, § 1.
80. In France, the reinstatement guaranty was reciprocal as to contracts for a
specified period. Decree of April 21, 1939, April 1939 Journal Officiel de la R~publique
Francaise 5234, art. 3.
81. The contrary conclusion might seem to follow from the provision guaranteeing
to the conscript the same position that he held before he was called up. Section 8(b).
Also the language of the Act that the conscript "shall be considered as having been
on furlough or leave of absence during his period of training and service" protects rights
whose acquisition normally depends on the continuity of the contract of employment.
Section 8(c).
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conscripted worker - not employed at will - for failure to return to his
position.
The Labor Board's 'policy of requiring unlawfully discharged employees
to make application for reinstatement with the employer before seeking the
benefits of the Act8 2 is expressly embodied in the Selective Service Act.
But the inflexibility of this statute may force the courts to demand proof
of even a patently futile application, a result contrary to the Board's de-
cisions.8 3 In the ordinary case, the application requirement is a sensible
provision, since it not only assures the employer that drafted employees who
intend to seek reinstatement will return to work shortly after their release,
but also furnishes a convenient point from which to compute damages if
the employer wrongfully refuses to rehire.8 4 Since right to reinstatement
appears to be a prerequisite to compensation,8 r a conscript who obtains work
elsewhere after denial of his applications might not, if he keeps his new
position, be able to recover damages for the period of his unemployment.
But a contrary result has been reached under substantially similar phrase-
ology in the Wagner Act.80 Since the draft law authorizes only the recovery
of losses actually suffered, the court should take into account any sums the
conscript .may have earned since the refusal to rehire,8 7 any incapacitation
during the period, s8 and the seasonal nature of the employment.82 While
work-relief payments received by the conscript should operate to mitigate
damages, the Supreme Court's recent decision under the Wagner Act00
that an employer is not required to reimburse the public agency seems con-
sonant with the draft law provisions.
82. Williams Coal Co., 11 N.LR.B. 579 (1939).
83. E.g., Jacob A. Hunkele, 7 N.L.R.B. 1276 (1938).
84. That the draft law contemplates the use of .the time of application and refusal
may be inferred from the fact that generally the employer will have done no illegal act
until refusal of the application. Quacre, which would govern if the refusal and applica-
tion occurred on different dates. In the case bf unfair labor practices, the Labor Board
computes back pay from the time of the discrimination. 3 REP. NLRB (1939) 201.
85. Section 8(d) (c) provides: ". . . the district court . . . shall have power
% * to specifically require such employer to comply with such provisions, and, as an
incident thereto, to compensate such person . ., ." .(Italics supplied).
86. Mooresville Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 94 F. (2d) 61 (C.C.A. 4th, 1938);
jaden Mfg. Co., 19 N.L.R.B. No. 23, Jan. 8, 1940; see (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 956. Contra:
NLRB v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 99 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938), ccrt. denied, 305
U. S. 646 (1939).
87. Cf. 2 REP. NLRB (1938) 152. Recovery for any incidental benefits lost, however,
is. specifically authorized by § 8 (e),
88. Cf. La Paree Undergarment Co., Inc., 17 N.L.R.B. No. 10, Nov. 2, 1939; Eagle-
Picher Mining & Smelting Co., 16 N.L.R.B. No. 71, Oct. 27, 1939.
89. Cf. NLRB v. Planters Mfg. Co., 106 F. (2d) 524 (C. C. A. 4th, 1939).
:90. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 9 U. S. L. VEaE 4019 (U. S. Nov. 12, 1940).
In numerous cases the Labor Board had held that work relief payments received by
employees were to be deducted from back pay awards and repaid to the agency which
provided the necessary funds. See (1939) 53 HAv. L. REv. 141.
19401 ' "
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
For the protection of employers, the statute does not require reemploy-
ment where it is "impossible or unreasonable." 91 Thus, for example, rein-
statement would hardly be obligatory in the case of a necessary reduction
in employment 92 or discontinuance of the business.9 3 Unionization subse-
quent to the employee's call to service might produce difficult problems if
the union, having obtained a closed shop, either arbitrarily or with cause
refused to admit him to membership. Where the conscript had been a strike-
breaker, it would seem unreasonable to force the employer to endanger
amicable relations with the union by rehiring him.9 4 The success of the rein-
statement provision will depend on the wisdom of the courts in the exercise
of their discretion. 95 Since the escape clause may render the efficacy of the
job-restoration guaranty somewhat doubtful in the eyes of the conscript,
it seems unfortunate that the statute does not require the employer to enroll
on a preferential list those conscripts who, while eligible for reemployment,
have for just cause not been rehired.9 6 And where a position of "like seniority,
status, and pay" is unavailable, the employer might well have been required
to offer employment, in the most favorable position practicable, to those whose
training has terminated.
7
Conscription as a Means of Labor Control. - At an early point in the
administration of the Selective Service Act of 1917, its possibilities for direct-
ing the movement of labor became apparent. 98 And the potentialities of the
"Work or Fight" Regulation were appreciated, although the end of the war
prevented their consummation.9 9 The mainspring of this device is the granting
91. Section 8(b) (B).
92. Cf. Union Drawn Steel Co. v. NLRB, 109 F. (2d) 587 (C. C. A. 3d, 1940);
NLRB v. Bell Oil & Gas Co., 98 F. (2d) 405 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
93. Cf. Phillips Granite Co., 11 N.L.R.B. 910 (1939); Shell Petroleum Co., 10
N.L.R.B. 719 (1938).
94. Cf. Acierno v. North Shore Bus Co., 173 Misc. 79, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 170 (Sup.
Ct. 1939). Like considerations would apply to changes in seniority rights growing out
of agreements with the union.
95. Vesting discretion in the courts seems preferable to a restrictive enumeration
of the reasons which may be validly advanced by the employer in refusing reinstatement,
such as is provided in Decree of April 21, 1939, April 1939 Journal Ofliciel de la
Rdpublique Franaise 5234, art. 2.
96. Cf. F. R. Barrett, 3 N.L.R.B. 513 (1937); Smith Wood Products, Inc., 7
N.L.R.B. 950 (1938).
97. Cf. National Service (Armed Forces) Act, 1939, 2 and 3 GEo. VI, c. 81,
§ 14(1) (b) ; Law of Oct. 24, 1919, [1919] 2 PA.sINoMI 129 (Belgian law requiring that
in case of temporary impossibility of reinstatement the employer notify the worker as
soon as reinstatement becomes possible).
98. See 1 REP. PROVOST-MARSHAL-GEN. (1918) 33.
99. SEL TcIvE SERvIcE REGULATIONS (2d ed. 1918) § 121 A-L. See 2 REP. PROVOST-
MARSHAL-GFN. (1919) 4, 10, 12-18, 75-85; I-oague, Brown, and Marcus, Wartime
Conscription and Control of Labor (1940) 54 HARv. L. REV. 50, 58-59. The substance
of this Regulation was to authorize the local boards to investigate idlers and those
engaged in non-productive occupations and tinder certain conditions to withdraw their
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or maintenance of deferments only so long as a man is engaged and works
acceptably in industries or even plants which the government classifies as
contributing to the national effort.100
Since the government, in conscripting an army for modern war, may
plausibly assert that an individual not devoting his full time to an essential
occupation is a more appropriate subject for military service than one who
is, the constitutionality of this measure is not directly open to attack.10 ' The
Regulation under the 1917 Act was not challenged, and a similar regulation
could be made under the present law. 10 2 The "Work or Fight" principle,
reinforced by the use of furloughs for men already drafted 10 3 and the denial
of essential supplies to non-productive industries and of consumers goods
to recalcitrant individuals, offers possibilities of labor control as complete
as a direct labor draft 10 4 - and perhaps more effective. Real power to strike
would not exist' 0 5 and men would virtually be compelled to work at the
position and under the conditions assigned to them. The detailed operation
of such a policy is beyond the scope of this discussion. 00 In 1936, the Senate
Committee on the Munitions Industry strongl disapproved, 07 and subse-
deferred classification or to lower their order numbers. Definition of non-productive
occupations did not go beyond individuals engaged primarily in personal service - i.e.,
waiters, sales clerks, bellhops, etc.
100. See note 99 supra.
101. See Hoague, Brown, and Marcus, Warlime Conscription and Control of Labor
(1940) 54 H.Av. L. REv. 50, 87.
102. Section 5(e) vests in the President a broad discretion through the issuance of
such rules as he shall prescribe over all deferments. Section 5(h) provides that no
exemptions or deferments shall continue "after the cause therefor has ceased to exist."
Section 353 of the Regulations limits occupational deferments to six months, renewable
unless the board finds reclassification proper. In England postponement certificates for
domestic positions, business responsibilities, or extreme hardship are limited to six- or
twelve-month periods, and are subject to cancellation by the Minister of Labour and
National Service at any time. National Service (Armed Forces) Act, 1939, 2 and 3
GEo. VI, c, 81, § S.
103. The Industrial Furlough Act, 40 STAT. 450 (1918) authorized furloughing of
soldiers for industrial or agricultural work, but was limited to those voluntarily applying.
However, express statutory authority for such a policy may not be needed. See 2 REP.
PRovosr-MmsnsHAI-GEx. (1919) 16.
104. See SEN. REP. No. 944, Part 4, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 48, 49.
105. President Wilson threatened to withdraw the deferments of certain employees
who had refused to accept an award of the National War Labor Board. U. S. Dep.t
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics No. 287 (1920) 36. Other devices are the with-
holding of supplies through a priority system and the use of drafted men as strikebreakers.
See SEN. REt. No. 944, Part 4, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 49, 52. At present, although
actual violation of the law might be avoided, the use of draftees as strikebreakers would
conflict with the policy expressed in the Byrnes Act, which forbids interstate transporta-
tion of strikebreakers. 49 STAT. 1899 (1936), as amended, 52 SrAT. 1242 (1938), 18
U.S.C. § 407(a) (Supp. 1939).
106. See Hoague, Brown, and Marcus, Wartime Conscription and Control of Labor
(1940) 54 HLv. L. REv. 50.
107. SFff. REP. No. 944, Part 4, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 4.
1940]
